Introduction
We document that renting households spend a constant fraction of income on housing expenditures in each of the top 50 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 1980 (MSAs) in , 1990 (MSAs) in , and 2000 . When household preferences are chosen to replicate this fact in equilibrium, a standard model of location choice predicts that the relative price of housing of any two MSAs disproportionately reflects differences in incomes of those MSAs and is independent of housing supply in each MSA.
When preference parameters are calibrated to match the data on housing rents and incomes, the model implies that each percentage point differential in wages across any two MSAs leads to more than a 4 percentage point differential in rental prices in those MSAs. Given data on wages in MSAs, the model predicts more dispersion in rental prices across MSAs than we observe.
In other words, without reference to amenities, differential supply constraints, heterogeneous abilities or preferences, or consumption-externality based arguments, a standard model of location choice can explain the large differences in rental prices between high-price cities like San Francisco and low-price cities like Pittsburgh. In fact, our calibrated model, designed to reproduce the constancy of expenditure shares, predicts an even greater disparity in rental prices between these two cities than we observe in the data. In our view, the relevant question for future research is: Why is San Francisco so cheap relative to Pittsburgh?
We begin our analysis by using microeconomic data from the last three Decennial Census of Housing (DCH) surveys to document that the ratio of housing expenditures (contract rent plus utilities) to income of renting households -our estimate of the expenditure share on housing -has been remarkably constant over time and across U.S. metropolitan areas. We use renter data to compute expenditure shares for housing because rental payments made by homeowners are never observed. Only mortgage payments for homeowners are observable, and mortgage payments can vary across households even if implicit rents on underlying housing units are identical.
In the 1980, 1990 , and 2000 DCH surveys, our estimate of the expenditure share on housing by renting households displays little variation across MSAs despite significant variation in average income. The expenditure share on housing is also remarkably stable over time within each MSA, despite sometimes sizeable changes over time to real rental prices. This is our evidence supporting Cobb-Douglas preferences for consumption and housing.
In section 3, we consider the implications of a Cobb-Douglas preference assumption for the equilibrium distribution of housing prices across MSAs. In a simple multilocation model similar to Eeckhout (2004) , identical households costlessly choose their MSA in which to live and their housing and consumption. MSAs differ with respect to income that residents earn. There is a fixed stock of perfectly divisible housing units in each MSA. Given our estimate of 24 percent of income spent on housing, we show the difference in log rental prices of two MSAs must equal 4.2 (= 1/0.24) times the difference in log per capita income. In other words, if income growth in any MSA outpaces growth in average income across MSAs by 1 percentage point, rental prices in that MSA will outpace the average growth in rental prices by 4.2 percentage points.
Thus, rental prices in an MSA will not in general increase at the same rate as income in that MSA.
The economics of this result are straightforward. Because expenditure shares are constant across locations in equilibrium, households living in high-wage MSAs spend more on both consumption and housing. Therefore they consume a greater quantity of the consumption good. The equilibrium condition that all MSAs provide the same level of utility ensures that these households consume a smaller quantity of housing.
It follows that in equilibrium, the ratio of rental prices across any two MSAs must be higher than the ratio of wages in those MSAs.
The equilibrium condition that agents are indifferent across locations requires that indirect utility be identical everywhere. This requirement determines relationships between rental prices and wages in any two locations that are independent of the total quantity of housing in any location. Of course, the level of rents in every location is determined by market-clearing conditions for housing -implying that the level of housing supply in any location affects the level of rents everywhere. However, when agents have Cobb-Douglas preferences for consumption and housing, the relative price of housing in any two MSAs is completely independent of the total supply of housing in any MSA. That is, contrary to the results of Gyourko et al. (2006) and others, wages -not housing supply -determine the relative price of housing in San Francisco or any other high-priced area. This is an analytic result derived directly from the model.
In section 4, we use year-2000 DCH data to compute constant-quality wages and rental prices for the MSAs in our sample. We then calibrate our model and compare the model-predicted rental prices for each MSA to the data. Given the observed dispersion in wages across MSAs, the model easily predicts all the dispersion in rental prices. In fact, the model predicts that rental prices in many high-wage MSAs should be higher than what we actually observe. This result also holds when we adjust wages for local consumption prices.
Finally, in section 5, we use a dynamic version of our model to explore its predictions for the price of housing (rather than rental prices). We use the result that rental prices disproportionately reflect differences in income to examine (as an extreme example from our data) differences in house prices in San Francisco and Pittsburgh. As of the year 2000, the difference in house prices of these two MSAs seems rationalizable if incomes are expected to increase one-half percentage point per year more quickly in San Francisco than in Pittsburgh, a result well within the experience of the past 20 years.
Our finding that the share of income spent on rent is constant across places and over time has important implications for the modeling of non-housing consumption and housing. The finding provides support for the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences for non-housing consumption (hereafter simply "consumption") and housing. These preferences are common in many macroeconomic models with a housing or homeproduction sector. For example, see Davis and Heathcote (2005) , Fisher (1997 Fisher ( , 2007 , Gervais (2002) , Gomme et al. (2001) , Greenwood et al. (1995) , Iacoviello (2005) , and Kiyotaki et al. (2008) .
The same finding is inconsistent with the key assumption of considerable research.
Several recent studies in finance and in macroeconomics try to explain the variability in stock prices and house prices by assuming that consumption and housing are more or less complementary than Cobb-Douglas in utility; see, e.g., Martin (2009), Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) , Kahn (2009), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) , and Piazzesi et al. (2007) . Other studies in urban economics and local public finance 
Evidence on Expenditure Shares
In this section, we study rental expenditures of households. We study renters because their expenditures on housing services -rents -are observable. Verbrugge (2008) and others have argued that rental payments on housing by homeowners can be proxied as a hypothetical mortgage payment computed as the product of a current mortgage rate and current house value. This procedure does not yield accurate measures of rental expenditures by homeowners because house prices reflect both current rents and expected future prices. Consider two homes in different locations but with same price. The mortgage-payment method would impute the identical rent to both houses. Now suppose that in one of the locations, house prices are expected to increase more rapidly than in the other location. The faster growth in house prices generates greater capital gains for the homeowner, reducing the user cost (i.e. rent) of the house. The mortgage-payment method would not capture this relevant difference in user cost.
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We construct an estimate of the expenditure share on housing by renting households using microeconomic data from the Decennial Census of Housing (DCH) files.
2 The first three columns in Table 1 When we use DCH data to compute expenditure shares for contract rent and utilities separately, we find an expenditure share for contract rent of 18 percent and an expenditure share for utilities of 6 percent. These estimates of expenditure shares are each about 3 percentage points higher than aggregate estimates that computed using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 1 House prices and mortgage payments can also vary across locations if the the location-specific risk component of housing assets varies. Campbell et al. (2009) and Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2009) suggest that these risk premiums may vary significantly across MSAs. The fourth column in Table 1 The last column in Table 1 The 25th and the 75th percentiles of the distribution of expenditure shares within each MSA are also stable across MSAs and over time. Table 2 shows that the average 25th and 75th MSA percentiles of the expenditure shares are 17 and 36 percent (with standard deviation of about 2 and 4 percentage points), respectively. Within each MSA, however, the expenditure share on rent is decreasing with household income.
One possibility is that rental expenditures do fall with income, and that our finding that median expenditure shares are nearly constant across 50 MSAs and three decades 4 Of course, the NIPA estimate might also be too high. Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) argue that a "user cost" approach provides a better estimate than a "rental equivalence" approach to estimating the cost of housing services to homeowners. is a coincidence. This is not our view. We suspect the gap between consumption and income is key to explaining why expenditure shares fall with income.
Suppose that consumption is equal to permanent income, and that observed income for person i is equal to permanent income for that person,w i , times a deviation of income from permanent income, u i , or
We assume that the median of u i is 1. This would occur if the natural log of u i is normally distributed with mean 0 and some variance σ 2 . If each person spends a constant fraction α of permanent income on rent, the observed expenditure share is a random variable with a distribution of
An unbiased estimate of α is the median of equation (2), as the median value of u i is equal to 1, by assumption. As long as the distribution of u i is similar across MSAs, the distribution of our estimated expenditure shares will also be similar across MSAs.
This may be the reason the interquartile range of the expenditure share is stable across
MSAs and over time. If deviations of (w i /x i ) from average do reflect differences in current income from permanent income, u i should reflect life-cycle income profiles: u i should rise with age until somewhere around age 55, and then decline. To test this, we compute deviations of log (w i /x i ) from its average -these deviations are exactly equal to log (u i ) -and then regress the deviations on age of the primary wage earner of the household (binned into 5-year intervals). The coefficients from these regressions for all three DCH years are shown in Figure 1 . The coefficients on each age segment are broadly comparable across years, and the coefficients behave as expected. 6 An alternative explanation for the data in Table 2 is that there may be within-MSA variation in tastes for housing. Families with children might choose to devote more to housing than childless families. As long as the distribution of preferences for housing does not vary across MSAs, the analysis of this section holds.
In a final check on the independence of expenditures on housing from permanent income, we study panel data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), made available for download by Aguiar and Hurst (2009 housing services, an assumption we adopt in our equilibrium model of location choice.
Model with Constant Expenditure Shares
Eeckhout (2004) uses a multi-city environment assuming households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption and housing to study the size distribution of places. We use a similar framework, but focus on the cross-sectional distribution of housing rents.
Environment
We consider an economy with N MSAs indexed by i = 1, . . . , N. The economy is populated by a measure 1 of identical agents. The decision problem of agents in this economy is static, so we suppress time subscripts. Agents choose where to live, how many non-housing goods to consume, and how much housing to rent. Given a set of housing rental prices for each MSA,
agents choose the MSA i, non-housing consumption c, and housing h that solve the problem:
with 0 < α < 1.
Note from the budget constraint that the price of consumption everywhere is equal to 1.0. 12 All agents who choose the same MSA i choose the same levels of non-housing consumption and housing:
and
An allocation is fully characterized by the set of non-housing consumption and housing chosen by agents in each MSA , {c i , h i } i=1,N and the measures of agents living in each MSA, {n i } i=1,N . An equilibrium in this economy is a set of rental prices
and an allocation such that: (1) Agents maximize their utility, taking rental prices as given; (2) In every MSA occupied, the housing market clears; i.e., n i h i = H i if n i > 0 ; (3) No household wants to move, i.e., all agents derive the same utility whatever MSA they choose.
We examine only sets of parameters such that all MSAs are occupied in equilibrium.
Rearranging the market clearing conditions and summing over all MSAs yields:
The condition that agents are indifferent between living in MSAs i and j means:
where we replace non-housing consumption using the solution to the agents' utility maximization problem. Rearranging, we obtain:
Combining this equation with equation (7) yields the equilibrium quantity of housing per agent in each MSA:
Plugging this equation into the solution to the agent's optimal housing choice yields the equilibrium rental prices:
From this we obtain equilibrium measures of households for each MSA:
Predictions
The model predicts that the optimal expenditure share on housing is constant at α in every MSA. Equations (11) and (12) can be combined to show that at the aggregate level, the model produces a constant ratio of rental expenditures to income:
The model predicts that the ratio of average rental price per unit to aggregate percapita income is independent of the dispersion of income across MSAs. Rather, the ratio of average rental price per unit to aggregate per capita income is equal to the expenditure share on housing divided by the average quantity of housing consumed per household:
The model predicts that the ratio of rental prices between any two MSAs i and j depends disproportionately on the ratio of their incomes. Working with equation (11), it is easy to show that
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In equilibrium, to ensure that agents are indifferent to living in any two MSAs i and j, it must be that:
Now, suppose that residents of city i earn more than residents in city j. This implies from equation (5) that c i is higher than c j . If c i > c j , then h i < h j for equation (16) to hold. Since consumption and housing are complements in utility, rental prices must be relatively high in the high-income MSA.
Equation (15) 
Model Fit
After taking logs of equation (15), and recognizing that equation (15) holds for any k,
we link rental prices and wages in MSA i to the average across a set of N MSAs:
We definer andw such thatr
and construct predicted rental values for each MSA, r i , as
We set α = 0.24 and use equation (20) To proceed, we need to compute a standardized measure of income, w i , appropriate for each MSA. That is, we want to remove variation in median MSA income reported in Table 1 that arises from variations in average levels of human capital and average numbers of workers in households across MSAs. To do this, we turn to microeconomic data from the 2000 DCH. On an MSA-by-MSA basis, we run a Mincer-style regression of the log of reported wage and salary income for any one who worked at least 40 weeks in the past year on a constant and a set of human capital variables. These variables include sex, age in 5-year brackets, and categorical variables for educational attainment (none or missing, less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, college degree or higher). On average, these regressions capture 32 percent of the variation in log wages within each MSA.
By regressing wages on age and education variables, we control for the variation in within-MSA wages that is attributable to differences in human capital. We use wage and salary income, rather than a broader measure that includes transfer or capital income, to focus on income-earning potential that is location-specific. We consider only income of those working 40 weeks or more in the past year to abstract from differences in average wages across MSAs that are attributable to differences in the number of part-time workers.
To compute a standardized wage that holds age and human capital constant across locations, we multiply the estimated regression coefficients in each MSA by the fraction of workers for the entire U.S. that is appropriate for each dummy variable in the regression. Then we multiply by 1.53 to compute average household income in an MSA;
this is the average number of full-time workers in each household, for all households that include at least one full time worker.
We estimate constant-quality rental prices r i consistently across MSAs similarly. On an MSA-by-MSA basis, we regress the level of gross rents paid by renting households on available characteristics of the housing unit and the method and time of commute (home to work) of the highest income earner in the household. For housing unit characteristics, we include categorical variables for number of rooms, number of bedrooms, year the unit was built, and total number of units in the building in which the unit is located, and from these categorical variables we generate a full set of dummy variables. (20), r i , and the difference between the observed and the predicted rental rate, denoted e i . Table 3 shows that, given the distribution of wages across MSAs, the simple frictionless model can easily generate the observed distribution of rental prices. In fact, the model overpredicts the dispersion of rental prices. The standard deviation of predicted rental prices, $293, is higher than the observed standard deviation, $145. The correlation of e i and w i is -0.92, implying the calibrated model predicts that rental prices are not high enough in high-wage places and too high in low-wage places. Figure 2 plots the predicted relationship between wages and rents as the solid line alongside plusses marking the wage and rent data shown in Table 3 . Figure 2 shows that the model underpredicts rental prices in relatively low wage places like Pittsburgh (the solid circle marked as "PT") and overpredicts rental prices in relatively high wage places such as San Francisco ("SF").
We perform two sensitivity analyses to ensure that this last result is a robust feature of the data. In the first, we eliminate homeowners from our regressions and computations of MSA-average wages, so that MSA-specific calculations of r i and w i are from exactly the same samples of renting households. In the second, we include 14 The standardized wage estimates are very close to estimates of median household income by MSA for all households, owner and renter, in 2000 (not reported). The w i reported in Table 3 are systematically higher, but have a correlation of 0.90 with the median household-level wage and salary income for renters reported in Table 1 .
only households where (a) the primary respondent in the household has moved to a different metropolitan area within the past 5 years and (b) the previous metropolitan area of residence is directly identifiable. Although our estimates of w i change in the first analysis, and w i and r i both change in the second analysis, in both analyses the correlation of e i and w i is approximately -0.90.
One question that arises is whether a small change in the fraction spent on rent more closely aligns predicted rental rates with observed rental rates. It is possible to
show that potentially reasonable changes to α are not sufficient to drive the correlation of e i and w i to zero. For example, at α = 0.35, the correlation of e i and w i is -0.65.
When α = 0.52, the correlation falls to zero. Thus, our finding that w i and e i are negatively correlated seems robust, because in economic terms expenditure shares of 50 percent are far from the 24 percent we estimate.
There are a few reasons the model may overpredict dispersion in rental prices. To start, we may be overestimating the dispersion in constant-quality wage rates and underestimating the dispersion in constant-quality rental rates. In the case of wages, even after controlling for observables in our wage regressions, workers in high wage places like San Francisco may be of higher unobservable skill than workers in low wage places like Pittsburgh. In the case of rents, the hedonics used in the rent regressions to uncover constant-quality rental prices may be too crude, and our measure of rental price per unit might reflect expenditures instead of prices. In this case, to the extent that quantities of housing consumed are low in high-wage places and high in low-wage places (as theory predicts), we would expect our measured dispersion of rental price per unit to be biased downward.
An alternative explanation is that some fraction of non-housing consumption may be produced locally. If the prices of locally produced consumption goods are correlated with wages, then real wages after accounting for variation in consumption prices are likely to be less dispersed than nominal wages. If wages are less dispersed, predicted rental prices will also be less dispersed, holding α constant. 
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To incorporate local prices in our model, and be consistent with the construction of the ACCRA data, we assume that households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over a bundle of S consumption goods and housing. That is, utility in city i is assumed to be of the form
and households are subject to the budget constraint
where we assume that S s=1 β s + α = 1. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, households optimally choose constant expenditure shares on the bundle of all consumption items and housing, p i,s c i,s = β s w i and r i h i = αw i .
In equilibrium the relation among rental prices, wages, and consumption prices in any two MSAs i and j is:
where
After adjusting nominal wages for consumption prices, as in equation (24), we predict rental prices using an equation similar to (20) , replacing w k with w k and appropriately redefiningr i andw i .
We compute S s=1 p βs i,s for 48 of our 50 MSAs, eliminating Buffalo, NY, and Bakersfield, CA. 17 We match the ACCRA metropolitan division codes to the relevant MSAs.
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We assume households consume a basket of S = 4 consumption items -groceries, transportation, health care, and miscellaneous -and proportionately rescale the four ACCRA expenditure shares so that the sum 4 s=1 β s = 0.76, which yields a 24 percent expenditure share on housing including utilities.
For the MSAs in our sample, Table 4 shows nominal wages, w i ; our estimate of consumption prices, p i = S s=1 p βs i,s (after a rescaling to set the average of p i across MSAs equal to 1.0); wages after adjusting for prices as in equation (24), w i ; actual rental prices, r i ; and predicted rental prices after wages have been adjusted for consumption prices, r i . Entries appear in descending order of nominal wages.
The correlation of nominal wages and consumption price levels (p i ) is high, 0.60.
After adjusting incomes for variation in consumer price levels, the standard deviation of predicted rental prices falls from $293 to $197, closer to the standard deviation in the data of $145. Yet, rental prices are still too high in places that offer relatively low wages after accounting for consumption prices. At α = 0.24, the correlation of the 17 ACCRA does not provide consumption price data for Buffalo, NY and for Bakersfield, CA. AC-CRA also does not provide consumption price data for San Jose, but we set consumption prices in San Jose equal to prices in San Francisco. 18 For about 10 of the larger MSAs, the ACCRA survey covers only a subset of metropolitan divisions within the MSA. We suspect this distinction is probably not of quantitative importance, except perhaps for the New York MSA, where we find the level of consumption prices is about 11 percent higher than the next-most pricey MSA, San Francisco. In the New York MSA, the only included metropolitan division (of four in total) is the New York-White Plains-Wayne division.
gap between actual and predicted rental prices, e i , and adjusted income, w i , shown in Table 4 is -0.72; and, the value of α required to set this correlation to zero is 0.71.
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We are aware we can more accurately predict rental prices, given the distribution of wages, if we are willing to redefine household utility. Ignoring variation in local consumption prices, suppose utility in city i is defined as z i c 1−α i h α i . In equilibrium, indifference across MSAs requires
Whatever z i is, assuming α = 0.24, the results of Tables 3 and 4 show it must be negatively correlated with wages. It could perhaps be a quality of life variable, as in Albouy (2009), Kahn (1995 ), or Rappaport (2008 . It also could be related to congestion externalities linked to density. Without z i , however, a simple model of location choice that reproduces the observation that housing expenditure shares are constant across locations predicts that rental prices in the highest-wage MSAs are higher than currently observed.
Extension: House Prices
Given that households are assumed to have no savings, they solve the static problem defined above each period. For a dynamic extension of the baseline model, we index rents and wages by time. The ratio of rental prices in any two MSAs at time t is
Suppose now that wages in MSA i increase at rate 1 + g i and wages in MSA j increase at rate 1 + g j , where g j does not have to equal g i . This implies:
19 At the suggestion of a referee, we experimented with subtracting utilities costs from rental prices in Tables 3 and 4 . This had the potential to increase the dispersion of measured rents because, across
MSAs, average utilities expenditures and rental prices are negatively correlated. However, the negative correlation is not pronounced enough to affect any of our main results, especially if we recalibrate α to 0.18, the appropriate value reflecting the expenditure share of rent exclusive of utilities payments.
Denote the growth rate of rents in MSA i as γ i and the growth rate of rents in MSA j as γ j . Then equation (27) implies
In words According to the classic dividend discounting model, the rent-price ratio is simply a required return less an expected rate of growth. Suppose the required return on housing is the same in both areas. 20 Then, the available data suggest that in 2000 the expected growth rate of rents was 2.0 (= 5.2 -3.2) percentage points per year higher in San Francisco than in Pittsburgh. Equation (28) A distinctive feature of our general spatial equilibrium model, relative to many papers in the urban economics and local public finance literatures, is our use of CobbDouglas preferences. This assumption yields a constant housing expenditure share in equilibrium, consistent with the evidence we uncover. The same assumption has been used to explain the distribution of population across places (Eeckhout 2004 and Rozenfeld et al. 2009 ) and to study the internal structure of cities (Lucas 2001 and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg 2002) .
Our multi-location model predicts that, in the aggregate, the ratio of rental prices per unit to per capita income is constant, as long as the aggregate stock of housing per capita is also constant. This is a common result of macroeconomic models when households have Cobb-Douglas utility. We show that this result does not hold at the MSA level; instead, rental prices disproportionately reflect income differentials.
We conclude that the common intuition that local house price indexes should rise at the same rate as local per capita income is incorrect whenever income growth differs across MSAs. 21 The median household wage and salary income for renters in San Francisco increased 2.2 percentage points per year more rapidly than the median wage and salary income for renters in Pittsburgh. Table 3 . 
